









DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND LEVEL OF








This paper has been accepted for publication
by the Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology. Any citations should be made to





DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND LEVEL OF RISK TAKING IN GROUPS
Abstract
This study reports evidence supporting the following propositions:
(1) Group discussion and consensus concerning decisions that involve
actual risk and payoffs lead to greater risk taking than occurs in the
absence of such discussion and consensus. (2) The mechanism that under-
lies this group-induced shift toward greater risk taking consists of a
diffusion or spreading of responsibility. Using risks and payoffs based
on monetary gain and 108s for problem-solving performance} the above
propositions received strong confirmation for male college subjects.
The results of various experimental manipulations provided positive sup-
port for viewing diffusion of responsibility as the causal factor at work.
DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND LEVEL OF RISK TAKING IN GROUPS1
In a recent study of individual and group decision-making, Wallach,
Kogan, and Bem (1962) found that a group consensus achieved through social
interaction tended to be more risky than the average decision of the in-
dividual members of those groups. In each of a number of hypothetical
life situations, a protagonist faced the choice between a more risky and
a less risky alternative. The individual or the group was asked to decide
on the lowest probability level for the success of the more risky alternative
that would suffice to warrant its choice. The generation of a greater risk
taking orientation was all the more intriguing because of the social forces
that might have been expected to yield an averaging effect or a move toward
greater conservatism as the product of group interaction. Averaging might
be expected through a process of minimizing the maximum individual conces-
sion; greater conservatism, through a fear of appearing foolhardy to others.
That greater risk taking occurred instead, however, suggested that individuals,
when constituted as a group, experience a diffusion of responsibility as a
product of the knowledge that one is deciding upon an action jointly with
others rather than deciding by oneself.
The present experiment was designed to cast further light on issues
raised by our previous work. Consider first the hypothetical nature of the
risks involved in the previous study's decision situations. Since the life
dilemmas dealt with by the individual or the group were hypothetical, one
must ask whether similar or different results would be obtained in decision
situations involving actual rather than hypothetical risks and payoffs.
Despite the realistic and highly involving character of the hypothetical
decision problems, the introduction of actual payoffs in the decision
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situation injects a new element. Whether this element will place limits
on the generalizability of our earlier findings is, of course, a matter
for empirical test.
The kind of group decision-making studied in the present investiga-
tion has two distinctive components. First, group members are striving
toward a group product--a decision between alternative courses of action
based on an evaluation of their desirability and probability of attainment.
This was the component involved in our previous study. A further com-
ponent, however, may come into play when actual in contrast to hypo-
thetical payoffs are introduced. Namely, the consequences of the deci-
sion !P.ay impinge upon the members of the group as a whole, thereby en-
gendering in each group member a feeling of responsibility for the others
who are perceived as linked with him in a common cause. For this second
component to be active, it may be necessary for the group members to be of
equal status, or at the very least, for no member to be entitled to special
privileges that would permit disproportionate enjoyment of or escape from the
consequences of the group decision. We shall refer to the two components
described above as group decision and group responsibility, respectively.
In our previous study, only the first element could be systematically
explored, for the obvious reason that decisions rendered under hypothetical
conditions do not have real outcomes. Uhder these circumstances, the issue
of mutual responsibility among group members is a peripheral one. The
development of strong feelings of mutual responsibility would seem to
depend on the group standing to gain or lose something as a consequence
of its decisions.
With these considerations in mind, the present experiment was designed
to permit a critical test of the extent to which the components of group
decision and group responsibility contribute to level of risk taking in
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group decision-making. We have already demonstrated that group decision
enhances risk taking propensities in a hypothetical decision context.
The introduction of actual payoffs into the decision context, however,
raises three further questions to which the present experiment will
address itself.
(1) Does group decision continue to exert its risk taking effects
under these new decision conditions?
(2) What are the effects of group responsibility upon level of risk
in group decision-making?
(3) What is the nature of the interaction between group decision
and group responsibility with regard to their joint effect on level of
risk in group decision-making?
Let us spell out the implications of the above questions in somewhat
greater detail. With regard to the first question, it might seem reasonable
to propose that the diffusion of responsibility presumed to characterize
subjects' decisions in our previous experiment should also exert its effect
in the present experimental context. Yet, the possibility must be con-
sidered that the previously observed effect might be attributed merely
to the absence of payoffs under the hypothetical decision conditions that
prevailed in our earlier work. 'Ilhe present experiment will attempt to
resolve this point.
Consider next the second question--the mutual responsibility that wey
be experienced among group members. Contrast the case in which the indi-
vidual1s decisions affect only himself with the case where his decisions af-
fect other members of his group. It would be very surprising indeed if the
latter condition failed to produce a greater level of conservatism in deci-
sion-making.
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The two questions examined thus far are intended to provide a basis
for a discussion of Question 3. The major purpose of the present study
is an assessment of gro"Qp relative to individual risk taking levels as
a joint function of group decision and group responsibility. We shall,
in other words, consider the consequences for risk taking of the presence
of both of the above independent variables, as well as the presence of one
in the absence of the other. The absence of both implies individual
decision-making, a control condition in the present investigationo
What can we expect to occur when group responsibility of the sort
described above--a force toward conservatism--is paired with group decision--
a force toward risk taking? There are several possibilities. The two inde-
pendent variables migl~ cancel each other, with the consequence that deci-
sions are neither more risky nor more conservative than comparable in-
dividual decisions; one or the other variable might prove to be dominant;
or the operation of one actually might change the character of the other in
the sense that one enlists the other in its service. Under this last pos-
sibility, the level of conservatism or risk when both variables are operating
would be greater than that found for either aloneo ThUS, if group responsibility
enlisted group decisi.on in its service, then group decision With group respon-
sibility present would lead to greater conservatism than was found with group
responsibility per se, even though group decision per se would lead to in-
creased risk taking. If, on the other hand, group decision enlisted group
responsibility in its service, then the presence of both would lead to
greater risk taking than occurred in the case of group decision per se,
even though group responsibility by itself would cause increased con-
servatism.
The present experiment has been designed to provide a definitive basis
for choosing among the va~ious alternatives spelled out above.
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Method
Procedure for Problem Sets 1-5
Prospective subjects were told that the experiment concerned decision-
making and problem solving and that they could earn up to $15 by participat-
ing. They were informed that the session would run no longer than one hour,
and were guaranteed that they would not earn less than $1.25.
In all conditions of the experiment, three college students met the
experimenter at a prearranged time and spread out around a conference
table in a seminar room with a blackboard. They were without previous
acquaintance and of the same sex. Each was given to understand that he
would work individually. He then was told:
If This is psychological research in the general area of decision-
making and problem solving. The experiment itself is quite straight
forward in the sense that you will be able to see the kinds of things we
are interested in as you go through it; there isn't anything particularly
hidden or mysterious about it. You will probably be most interested in
the problem-solving aspect of the experiment since it is upon this that
your salary depends. Your main task, which will take place in about the
last 20 minutes of this hour, will be to answer 10 multiple choice ques-
tions which have been taken from old College Board examinations. Specifically,
these have been taken from the morning aptitude tests, which means that no
particular course knowledge is assumed other than a high school education.
In other words, there will be no English Literature questions, calculus prob-
lems, etc. Your salary varies from a maximum of $15 down to the minimum
of $1.25 because you will be paid for each question answered correctly,
and you will not be paid for questions not answered correctly; it's that
simple. If you should hawen to earn less than $1.25 in this way, then we
-6-
add to the amount you have won to bring your salary up to that amount.
Your salary also varies because you are able to select how difficult a
question you want to try: harder questions pay a higher prize. I can
probably best illustrate the exact procedure we will follow by showing
you the answer sheets."
At this point the experimenter gave each subject a booklet titled
"Choices" and a pencil. The booklet consisted of 10 pages of the type
shown in Figure 1. The experimenter then continued:
Insert Figure 1 about here
"There are 10 sheets, all like the top one, stapled together. Each
sheet will correspond to one of the 10 questions you will be answering.
If you will look over on the right hand side where it says, t'Difficulty
levels to choose from,11 you will see a column of percentages. This column
has the following interpretation: Each percentage corresponds to a dif-
ferent question. The 30% question, for example, was failed by 3010 of the
people in the nation when that question appeared on the Board exams. In
other words, the questions get harder as you go down the column until you
reach one which 90% failed--or, only 10% were able to answer that question
correctly. The amount you can win for answering each question correctly is
shown in the extreme right hano. column; as I mentioned, you will notice that
the more difficult the question, the more you can win. You will have the op-
portunity, then, to select how difficult a question you want to try. Also,
these percentages have been adjusted slightly to correct for the fact that
it is high school seniors who take the exams; in other words, you may inter-
pret these percentages to be college level percentages.
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IlNow we don't expect you to know offhand just how difficult a question
at a particular level is without baving seen one. For this reason, you will
have the opportunity to work practice items to familiarize yourself with
the types of questions and the various difficulty levels. If you will
look in the main section of this top sheet you will see that you will
be working practice questions at the 10%, 35%, 60%, and 85% levels. 2
These practice questions will count neither for nor against you, and I
will give you the correct answers to them. In this way you will be able
to judge about how difficult all the levels will be. We didn't think you
would want to bother working a practice problem at each level, and so
these four are pretty well spread across the range and should give you
a good idea of the other levels of difficulty. You will notice'that the
practice questions are spaced on the page to correspond to the right hand
column from which you will actually be selecting the money questions. To
summarize, then: You will work four practice questions of a particular
type; I will give you the correct answers; and then you will select how
difficult a question--of that type--you want to try answering for money.
We will do this for each different type of question.
lINow, although we do not care whether you get the practice questions
correct or not, we are interested in knOW"ing just how conf'ident you are in
your answers: how sure are you that your answer is correct. That is what
the 'Confidence' column is for; each time you answer a practice question we
would like you to go immediately to this column and circle one of the code
letters. The code is given up here on the board; it is not particularly
profound; we just didn't have room for all that on the sheets."
The following had been present on the blackboard from the beginning of
the session:
vs =: very sure
QS =: quite sure
.MB =: moderately sure
SS =: slightly sure
NS
'"
not sure at all
If You should mark confidence levels as you go so they will be accurate,
rather than waiting until you finish all the practice items and going back.
Now will you, at the very top of this first sheet, write your name, your age,
and your college major. If you donlt nave a major yet, we would still like to
know if you think it will be science or non-science. tf
The experimenter then gave each subject a booklet titled "Practice Ques-
tions.1! It contained five types of questions: antonyms, mathematics, anal-
ogies, spatial relations, and sentence completions. The experimenter then
continued:
ttThese booklets I have just handed you contain all the practice ques-
tions, none of the money questions. If you will look at the cover of the
booklets, you will see that the first type of question we will be considering
is 'antonyms.l Will you, therefore, write the word 'antonyms' on your first
answer sheet where it says 'Type of Question.' Now read the example antonym
question they have worked for you; they want the word most opposite in meaning
to the given word. Now if you will turn the page, you will see four practice
antonym questions; these correspond to the loi, 35%, 60%, and 85% levels re-
spectively--you will feel them getting harder as you go down the page. These
should be answered in the answer column of your first sheet, then, in the ap-
propriate spaces."
After all practice questions were answered and confidence levels in-
dicated, the experimenter put the correct answers on the blackboard, reading
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them out as he wrote them: (e.g., "The correct answers to these are b, b,
c, d, in that order'~). They remained on the board for the remainder of the
session. Accurate and equalized feedback as to correct answers thus was
provided for all subjects. Toward the same end, in this and in all other
practice sets, the experimenter explained in detail the rationale or method
of solution for all of the more difficult questions, and encouraged and
answered questions about the items. Group discussion, in those conditions
where the subjects later experienced it, therefore could not provide any
more feedback concerning correct answers to these practice questions or
the rationales for the correct answers, than was already possessed by the
SUbjects in all cona.itions.
The experimenter then continued:
"Now that you see how difficult the problems are at the various levels
and about how well you can do on them, we want you to select one difficulty
level to try for money. You do this by circling one of the nine percentage
levels in the right hand colRmD. For example, after seeing these practice
problems, if you think you would like to try for the 9CP/o level question, you
should circle that level. Then, later when you answer all the money ques-
tions, I will give you~ antonym question which is slightly harder than
------versus------, which was the 85% level. If you get the question right,
you will win $1.50 for it; if you miss it, you will get nothing. This same
procedure applies to whatever level you select: the correct answer earns you
the amount shown in the extreme right hand column; failing the question means
you earn nothing. Remember that this does not obligate you to select the same
level for any other question; this decision you are making right now applies
only to the one antonym question, which will be drawn from the same files as
the practice problems you just worked. The practice problems are tntended
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only to be a guide in your d.ecision; you are free to select any level you care
to. Okay, go ahead and circle a level you want to try for money; donlt rush,
we have: plenty of time--this is your money youlre deciding on. 1t
The payoff schedule of amounts to be won for correct answers to questions
with varying probabilities of success was so arranged that the expected values
for all questions were equal and set at 15 cents. 3 As indicated on Figure 1,
the difficulty levels from which the subject made his choice varied in 10%
steps from items failed by only 10% of a norm sample (With a prize of 17 cents
fora correct answer) to items failed by 90% of that sample (With a prize of
$1.50 for a correct answer). The actual bet question itself was always defer-
red until the choices of difficulty levels for all ten sets of problems in the
experimentw.ere completed. This acted, of course, to eliminate the possible
influence that winnings might exert on choice of subsequent difficulty levels.
Here and in the subsequent problem sets, the experimenter indicated that he pos-
sessed a large pool of questions for each of the nine levels of difficulty, and
that he later would draw from this pool an actual bet question at the difficulty
level that each subject selected.
The experimenter then asked the subjects to turn to the next page of their
"Choices" booklet, write in "w.B.thematics ll next to "Type of Question, It and pro-
ceed as before. The procedure just described for antonyms was repeated in
identical fashion with a set of fourf!ilil8,thema;tics problems. Once again sample
items with difficulty levels of 10%, 35%, 60%, and 85% were used. After the
practice questions were answered and confidence levels indicated, the ex-
perimenter provided the correct answers and explained the rationale for the
more difficult items. Then each subject decided on a difficulty level for
the actual bet mathematics ques·tion that he would answer for money. The same
range of difficulty levels from which to select, and associated winnings for
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correct answers, were provided as have been described for antonyms. Once
again the answering of the actual bet question was deferred until 1atero
The above procedure was repeated for three more sets of problems:
analogies, spatial relations, and sentence completions. In each of the
analogies questions, the pair of words that best expressed a relationship
similar to that expressed by a given pair of words was selected from multiple
choice alternatives. In each of the spatial relations problems, a perspective
drawing of a set of blocks was presented in which some of the blocks necessary
to the structure could not be seen. The respondent was to determine, from
among multiple choice alternatives, the number of blocks in the structure.
Each of the sentence completion problems, in turn, consisted of a sentence
with one or two blanks in it. From multiple choice alternatives, the subject
had to choose the word or set of .words Which, when inserted in the sentence,
best fitted in with the sentence's overall meaning.
Procedure for Problem Sets 6-10
The difficulty levels chosen for the first five sets of questions, ac-
cording to the procedure described in the preceding paragraphs, prOVided a
baseline with which choice of diffiCUlty levels on question sets 6 through 10
could be compared. Whereas all subjects chose difficulty levels in the manner
described above for question sets 1 through 5, conditions of choice varied for
question sets 6 through 10. These conditions all shared two attributes, how-
ever. First, practice questions were not given for sets 6 through 10, since
these sets concerned the same types of questions that were encountered in sets
1 through 5. Second, the answering of the actual bet questions was deferred
until difficulty levels for all 10 question sets bad been chosen. Sub:jects
were not permitted to change any of their decisions concerning sets 1 through
5 in the course of their decisions for sets 6 through 10.
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Before embarking upon problem sets 6-10, subjects :i.n all conditions were
told:
llyou will notice that you are at the end of the practice booklet. This
is because the second five questions do not introduce any new type of ques-
tion. So, it is no longer necessary to work practice questions. Questions
6 through 10 will follow in the same rotation as the first five; so will you
write the word 'antonyms! on sheet 6. In other words, there will be two ques-
tions of each type and it is only necessary on these second five questions to
decide on the difficulty levels you care to try.
"In deciding what levels to try for on these second five questions, you
may refer back to the corresponding questions 1 through 5, to the decisions you
made on those, to the correct answers which are still on the board, or to the
question booklet. You need not select the same levels you picked before,
however; you are free to select any levels you wish for the last five ques-
tions.!!
Personal responsibility--group decision. Specific instructions for this
condition read as follows:
llWe are now interested in having you work on problems at difficulty levels
you have not chosen by yourself. for que stions 6 thr01Jgh 10. We want all three
of you to try the same levels of difficulty for each of the last five ques-
tions; the exact levels to be tried will be up to tbE three of you. In other
words, we want the three of you to discuss each type of question in turn and
come to a unanimous agreement on the level to be tried by all of you. This
should be unanimous, not just a majority decision.
I! Okay, why don I t the thre'e of you' decide what level 'i s to be tried· for
question 6, the antonym question. ll
-13-
This procedure continued for the remaining question sets.
Group responsibility--individual decision. Specific instructions for
this condition are as follows:
!tAs stated, you will all answer the first five questions at the levels
you have selected, but we only require one person to answer each of the second
five questions. If he answers the question correctly, all of you win the prize;
you donlt even have to split it--you all win the amount for that level. If,
however, he misses the question, then none of you wins anything. The person
responsible will be decided by chance by spinning this spinner. Each of you
will find a code letter on the front of your answer sheets; you are K, L, and
M. We will spin this spinner five times, once for each of the questions 6
through 10. In other words, on each question, you have one chance out of
three of being responsible to the entire group for it. 1f
The experimenter pointed to each subJect in succession when designating
their code letters. The spinner was divided into three equal segments labeled
with the corresponding code letters. The experimenter then proceeded:
IfYou will try the question at the level you are now about to select. Okay,
select a level you would like to try for the antonym question."
This procedure was continued for the remaining question sets. Each sub-
ject continued to select the difficulty level for each actual bet question in
private. No discussion among the subjects occurred at all.
Group responsibility--group decision--chance designation of responsible
group ~mber. The first paragraph of instructions for the immediately pre-
ceding condition was also used here. The experimenter then continued:
TIThe level to be tried for the various questions is entirely up to the
three of you. You are to discuss each of the questions 6 through 10 and come
to a unanimous agreement on the level to be tried. This will all take place
before you know who will be answering each question • Okay, Why don't the
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three of you decide what level is to be tried for question 6, the antonym
question. n
This procedure was continued for the remaining question sets.
In the two conditions where the spinner was used--group responsibility
with group decision (chance designation) and group responsibility with in-
dividual decision--the subjects knew that the spinning would be deferred
until after the difficulty levels for problem sets 6 through 10 had been
chosen.
Group responsibility--group decision--group designation of responsible
group member. Specific instructions for this condition duplicated the imme-
diately preceding "chance designationll condition, except that the choice of who
would be responsible for answering each actual bet question was determined not
by a random device, but rather by an agreement among the three subjects. By
this means, subjects could choose as their representative, for each type of
problem, the person among them who seemed most skilled in handling it.
Control condition. This condition represented a continuation, for problem
sets 6 through 10, of the procedure that prevailed during sets 1 through 5.
The three subjects continued to work individually. Comparison of the difficUlty
levels chosen on sets 6 through 10 with those chosen on sets 1 through 5 indi-
cated the magnitude of practice effects ensuing from a repetition of the ini-
tial task under identical conditions, and constituted a baseline against which.
the effects of the other conditions could be evaluated.
Answering of all actual bet questions was carried out in each condition
after all diffiCUlty levels had been decided upon, While these data are
i.rrelevant to the purposes of the present experiment, We carried through
this phase in order to fulfill our obligations to the subjects.
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Mode of Analysis for Changes in Risk Taking
The basic index is the degree and direction of shift in risk taking on
question sets 6 through 10 in comparison to sets 1 through 5. We may refer
to this as the overall shift index. In the control condition and the group
responsibility--individual decision condition, where no group interaction took
place, the overall shift index was computed for each individual. It consisted
of the mean of the individualrs chosen difficulty levels for sets 6 to 10 minus
the mean of his chosen difficulty levels for sets 1 to 5. In the three condi-
tions involving group decision, the overall shift index was computed for each
group. It consisted of the mean of the group's agreed upon difficulty levels
for sets 6 to 10 minus the grand average, for the three group members, of the
mean of their chosen difficulty levels for sets 1 to 5. The direction and
magnitude of the overall shift indices obtained in one experimental condition
then were compared with the direction and magnitude of the overall shift in-
dices obtained in another condition.
In addition to the overall shift index, similar indices also were con-
structed for each type of item considered separately. For example, the item
shift index for antonyms involved, in the control condition and the group re-
sponsibility--individual decision condition, each individual's chosen difficulty
level for set 6 minus his chosen difficUlty level for set 1; while, in tbe three
group decision conditions, it involved each grouprs consensus difficulty level
for set 6 minus the average, for the three group members, of their chosen dif-
ficulty levels for set 1. Analogously, the item shift index for mathematics
questions involved difficulty levels for sets 7 and 2. Once again, the direc-
tion and magnitude of the shift index for a particular type of item obtained in
one experimental condition were then compared with the direction and magnitude
of the shift index for that same type of item obtained in another condition.
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Shift indices for each type of item considered separately constitute a
kind of nitem analysis ll for the various parts of the experimental task and
are, of course, subordinate in importance to the overall shift index com-
puted for the task as a whole.
Controls
The overall shift index and the shift index for each of the five types
of items are difference or change scores. Since the shift in each experimental
condition was measured relative to the sUbject's own performance under the in-
dividual decision conditions of sets 1 through 5, the subjects in each condi-
tion, hence, provide their own control.
In addition to the control obtained through using difference scores as
just described, the eq~iva1ence of the subjects in the various conditions also
was directly checked with respect to a number of potentially relevant character-
istics. These were: degree of overall initial risk taking (the mean of the indiw
vidual's chosen difficulty levels on question sets 1 through 5) as well as degree
of initial risk taking on each type of item considered separately; level of
ability in answering the various types of practice items provided for sets I
through 5--both overall and for each type of item separately; degree of confi-
dence with which the sUbjects answered the various types of practice items
provided for sets 1 through 5--again, both overall and for each type of item
separately; age of the subjects; and the proportion of subjects with majors
implying vs. not implying a background in mathematics (the former group in-
cludes majors in the natural sciences, mathematics, and engineering).
Subjects
The participants were 336 male and female undergraduates enrolled in the
summer session of the University of Colorado at Boulder. There were 168
subjects of each sex, and they were randomly assigned to the various
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conditions. Within each sex, 45 subjects served in each of the conditions that
involved three-person groups: namely, the two group responsibility--group de~
decision conditions and the personal responsibility--group decision condition.
There were, therefore, 15 groups in each of these conditions. Within each
sex, 15 subjects served in the group responsibility--individual decision con-
dition, and 18 subjects served in the control condition, The sample size
within sex for each of the five conditions of the experiment thus was either 15 or
18", the!'!. referring to groups in the conditions that involved group cormnunica-
tion, and to individuals in the conditions that did not involve cormnunication.
Results and Discussion
Results for Males
Controls. As noted above, control was built in through measuring each
condition's degree of shift relative to performance by the same persons in an
individual decision context. In addition, the five conditions of the experi-
ment a.id not differ significantly from one another in the subjects r mean over-
all levels of risk taking for problem sets 1 through 5, nor in the variances
for overall risk taking on sets 1 through 5. Analogous homogeneity across
conditions prevailed with regard to means and variances for risk taking on
sets 1 through 5 in the case of each type of item considered separately. The
average risk taking level on sets 1 through 5 was 69.7%, with a range from
6~.w% to 72.6% for the various types of items.
The subjects in the five experimental conditions were similar with re-
gard to level of ability in answering the practice items that were prOVided
for problem sets 1 through 5. The percentages of subjects in each condition
failing each of the 20 practice i terns prOVided d.id not vary by more tha.n chance
margins. In addition, the distributions of confidence levels for answers to
each of the 20 practice questions showed only chance variation across
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conditions. Further, intransitivity in answers to practice questions at dif-
ferent difficulty levels was rare.
Finally, the distributions of ages for subjects in the various experi-
mental conditions were homogeneous, as were the proportions of subjects in
the various conditions with majors that imply a background in mathematics
(all proportions were 33% or less).
Overall shift indices. The first column of Table 1 presents the basic
findings of the experiment for the male subjects. Shown for each condition is
Insert Table 1 about here
the mean overall shift in chosen difficulty level, and hence in level of risk
taking, for problem sets 6 through 10 in comparison with problem sets 1 through
5. The more detailed nature of this overall shift index was described earlier.
The mean overall shift index for each condition is a percentage because it in-
dicates the average shift, per individual and per type of problem, in prefer-
red difficulty level as defined with reference to the percentage of a norm
sample failing the problem. An increase in the percentage--i.e., a positive
shift--hence indicates an increase in risk taking.
Consider first the results for the condition of personal responsibility--
group decision. Note in the first column of Table 1 (row 2) that the average
increase in risk taking for this condition is 5.6%, compared to the mean in-
crease of 2.4% obtained for the control condition (row 1). In the first column
of Table 2 (row 1) we note that a test of the difference between these two means
Insert Table 2 about here
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yields a i value of 1.74) which is significant beyond the .05 level by a one-
tailed test. This finding, then) suggests that group decision per se fosters
risk taking in groupso Accordingly, the results of our previous experiment
in which decisions of a hypothetical sort were obtained can now be generalized
to a decision-making context involving actual risks and payoffs for the group
members. Despite the fact that each group member will personally have to
bear the consequences for the group decision, it is evident that the element
of group discussion to consensus tends per se to encourage increased risk
taking.
We turn next to the group responsibility--individual decision condition,
where we expected a shift toward conservatism in decision-making. It can be
seen that such a conservative shift did, in fact, occur. Note in Table 1
(row 3) that the mean overall shift index is -1.6%. Table 2 (row 2) indicates
that this difference score is significantly more conservative than t~~t of the
control condition (t = -2.30, ~ < .02, one-tailed test). It is evident then
that group responsibility per se does function as a conservative agent in
decision-making, whereas the process of group decision contributes to increased
risk taking. Not surprisingly, as row 5 of Table 2 demonstrates, the two con-
ditions are significantly different from each other.
Having examined the effects on risk taking of group responsibility and
of group decision taken one at a time, we turn now to the major inquiry of
the study: namely, what happens when both are present simultaneously? As
the last two rows of Table 1 show, the results are quite surprising. It is
strikingly evident that the two variables under consideration, which operate
in antithetical directions when separate, do not algebraically sUIl1I!J8,te, nor
does one simply dominate over the other, when they are placed together. Rather,
responsibility for others ceases to function as a pressure toward conservatism
when it is paired with the force generated by a group seeking consensus in
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decision-making. The factor of group responsibility actually seems to change
its psychological character and to become, when paired with group decision,
a force toward greater risk taking. As rows 3 and 4 of Table 2 indicate,
the shifts toward greater risk taking for both group responsibility--group
decision conditions are significant well beyond the .001 level by two-tailed
tests (! = 3.76 and 5.56, respectively).
How can we account for the fact that these conditions yield such a strong
shift toward greater risk taking? Consider first the chance-designation condi-
tion where each member has a one-in-three opportunity of being responsible for
any particular problem. Is it feasible that this aspect of the task--the one-
in-three chance--enhances risk takingZ If this factor were critical, however,
why should it not function in the same manner under conditions of individual
decision? Recall the difference observed in row 2 of Table 2. There, we
noted that decisions become more conservative, despite one-in-three odds of
being chosen, relative to individual decision-making where a person is res-
ponsible for each item.
Evidently, we must look to other sources to explain the substantial risk
taking shifts observed when group decision is paired with group responsibility.
It is apparent that group responsibility has a very different meaning When a
group discussion takes place than when it does not take place. Where there is
group discussion to consensus, we would suggest that each member, by drawing
support from the others, begins to feel that his fate rests with the group;
therefore, greater risk taking is warranted. Given this type of group atmos-
phere, what are the distinctive forces at work upon group members who know
that they will be responsible for the success or failure of the group?
The more risky the character of the group decision, the greater the like-
lihood that any group member will fail in carrying out his group responsibility.
We should like to suggest tbat such failure would have a quite different meaning
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in the case where it has been preceded by group decision than in the individual
decision condition. In the latter case, failure would be a heavy burden to
bear, for an individual's decision is his alone. The other participants had
no voice in its determination; hence, the burden of failure rests squarely
on the shoulders of the individual decision-maker. Contrast this with the
condition in which the individual member is responsible for carrying out a
group decision. If the individual lets the group down, there is the consoling
fact that the initial decision was not his alone. The group shares the blame
for defeat as much as it shares the credit for success.
The line of reasoning pursued above also applies in the case of the group
responsibility--group decision condition in which the group is permitted to
designate the group members responsible for carrying out its decisions. While
the highest risk taking levels were found in this condition, no significant
difference obtains relative to the other group responsibility--group decision
condition (Table 2, row 10). In short, it doesnrt appear to make too great
a difference whether gro11p responsibility is determined by chance processes or
by group designation. The latter condition is, however, significantly different
from the personal responsibility--group decision condition (Table 2, row 7),
while the former is not (Table 2, row 6).
The findings of the present experiment, in SUill, support the interpreta-
tion that, in a context of actual risks and payoffs, a group-induced shift
toward greater risk taking is produced by pressures toward consensus in
decision-making. Quite surprisingly, this effect is enhanced rather than
diminished when a single group member is to be made responsible for carrying
out the group decision. We attempted to account for this result in terms of
the diffusion of responsibility that each group member experiences as a
consequence of the group decision-making process. Each individual may feel
that the group will partially absolve him of blame for possible failure,
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given the fact that the individual is acting on a group-derived deci-
sion.
Perhaps of especial interest is the pivotal role that is possessed
by the factor of connnunication. While group responsibility in the presence
of group decision leads to a strong risky shift, group responsibility in
the absence of group decision leads to a conservative shift. This outcome
helps to specify what may be responsible for the typical view that the ef-
fect of group decision-making is to induce greater conservatism rather than
greater risk taking. Greater conservatism will clearly be the result if
responsibility for others is created without the opportunity for sufficient
communication to consensus. Such blocking of communication may well occur
when status inequalities exist among the members of a group. Communication
among status equals, on the other hand, results in powerful tendencies to-
ward risk taking.
Shift indices for each type of item. Columns 2 through 6 of Tables 1
and 2 present the data for each type of item taken separately. These item
analyses evaluate the uniformity of the obtained effects for the different
kinds of item content. From Table 1 we note that the mean shift indices for
each type of item considered alone (columns 2-6) exhibit the same general pat-
tern across the five experimental conditions as does the mean overall shift
index based on all types of items combined (column 1). If we arrange the con-
ditions in an order running from most risky to most conservative in terms of
the mean overall shift index, the analogous orderings of conditions for each
type of item separately are maintained. in 17 out of the 20 comparisons that
can be made (there are four comparisons between adjacent pairs of conditions
in the case of each of the five types of items). This finding suggests that
the differences in performance among the various experimental conditions are
reasonably uniform for the various types of items. The same conclusion is
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supported by the! test data in columns 2-6 of Table 2. No particular type of
item stands out as making much more or much less of a contribution than any
other to the overall differences obtained among the various experimental
conditions. Of some interest is the observation that the verbal types of
items (antonyms, analogies, sentence completions) and the quantitative types
of items (mathematics, spatial relations) operate in ways that are more similar
than dissimilar.
Results for Females
Unlike the results obtained in our previous experiment where both males
and females exhibited risk taking shifts as a consequence of group decision,
the females in the present study do not manifest the dramatic effects obtained
in the male sample. However, the overall shift index for the group responsi-
bility--group decision condition where the group designates the responsible
member turned out to be significantly larger in the risky direction than the
index for any of the other four conditions. Comparing this shift with the
shifts in conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4, the t values were 3.68, 3.72, 4.44, and
3.32, respectively.
We shall return later to his exception to the general trend in the female
results. At this point, we should note that the intellectual and monetary in-
centives employed in the present experiment may have had a much lesser impact
on the female than the male sample. Such a sex difference is quite consistent
with the literature on need for achievement, and might well be anticipated on
the basis of relevant evidence (e.g., McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell,
1953; Atkinson, 1958; Atkinson, Bastian, Earl, & LitWin, 1960; Atkinson &
Litwin, 1960). The basic generalizations that these authors have been able
to draw concerning the existence of the achievement need and the nature of
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its correlates--including correlates in the area of risk taking--hold for
male college students but not for females.
One may well ask what kind of incentive would be most appropriate for
a female sample. If it be assumed that incentives focusing on affiliation
are more relevant for women, then the greater risk taking exhibited by women
in the one experimental condition referred to above becomes comprehensible.
A condition in which group members nominate one another to carry out tasks
is especially likely to tap affiliation needs in a female sample. Hence,
the increased risk taking observed for women in that condition may be more
a reflection of the group's overt support of its nominated members, than of
any strong need for intellectual achievement or monetary gain. 4
Theoretical and Practical Implications
Our previous study (Wallach, Kogan, & Bern, 1962) demonstrated that group
decision led to an increase in risk taking in a situation where the risks
and payoffs involved were hypothetical. The present experiment demonstrates
that comparable results are obtained when the decisions concern risks and
payoffs that are actual rather than hypothetical. Hence, the effect has
been shown to have considerable generality.
We suggested earlier that the mechanism generating this group-induced
shift toward greater risk taking is a process of diffusion or spreading of
responsibility. This may occur as a result of knowing that one's decisions
are being arrived at jointly with others rather than alone. The present
experiment sought more explicit evidence on the appropriateness of this inter-
pretation. Group decision per se was found to yield a risky shift. Re-
sponsibility for others per se was found to yield a conservative shift.
Presence of both elements together, however, was found to generate a very
strong shift in the risky direction, indicating that the group responsibility
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factor actually changed its character when it was linked with group deci-
sion. Despite the conservative influence of group responsibility on
decision-making in the absence of group decision, then, the introduction
of a consensus requirement overwhelms that influence, yielding marked shifts
toward risk taking. Apparently, group decision brings about a diffusion
of responsibility in two distinct and separate ways. First, it operates
at the level of decision-making itself, pushing decisions in the risky
direction. Second, it reduces the felt responsibility of any group member
designated to act as the group's representative. In the eyes of the
responsible group member, the group shares his responsibility since the
decision was a group product. Accordingly, higher risk levels with their
associated greater probability of failure can be more readily tolerated
than in the case where the group's representative must carry out his re-
sponsibility without the opportunity for such communication.
Let us turn now to possible practical implications of the present work.
As our previous study emphasized, groups have generally been assumed to exert
either a conservative influence on individuals arriving at a group decision
(Whyte, 1956) or an averaging influence (Cartwright & Zander, 1960). In
short, group decision-making has been claimed to serve a check-and-balance
function. The data of the present experiment seriously call into question
this ass.umption.
One area where the implications of our findings may be of the utmost im-
portance is that of military strategy and policy. Consider, for example, a
group of military advisers to a chief of state o.iscussing with him the pros
and cons of positive military action against a troublesome neighboring state.
A consensus has been reached, let us say, on what course to pursue. Compare
the above with our group responsibility--group decision conditions. Recall
that these conditions produced strong shifts toward greater risk taking.
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A similar dynamic may exist in the decision arrangements that the major
powers have set up for evaluating information about the imminence of a
potential enemy attack. One can anticipate a staff of experts communicating
with each other about the import of the information being received. This
information, if it has been received early enough to be of any use at all,
is likely to be equivocal. Yet if a decision to launch one's nuclear bombs
is to be tactically effective, it must come quickly, since onels ability to
retaliate is likely to be strongly reduced if one gets hit by the enemy first.
(See, for example, Schelling, 1958; Hubler, 1958; Brodie, 1959; Brody, 1960.)
It is presumed that the staff of experts, communicating about the meaning of
incoming information, will thereby have a conservative, check-and-balance
type of influence on one another. Yet, as our experiment has demonstrated,
conditions may be present which generate diffusion of responsibility and
thereby increased risk taking.
We do not wish to push these analogies too far. The argument might be
raised that the problem of nuclear strategy introduces deterrents and risks
on so grand a scale that a unique set of forces is at work. Nevertheless,
the fact remains that highly critical decisions are being made by groups of
men none of whom can claim infallibility. At the very least, then, the pos-
sible relevance of the present experimental findings for decision-making ar-
rangements governing military strategy certainly needs to be assayed.
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Footnotes
~his study was supported by an Auxiliary Research Award from the Social
Science Research Council and by a grant (G-17818) from the National Science
Foundation. The data were gathered during the 1962 surmner session at the
University of Colorado in Boulder. We are indebted to M. E. Lipetz, V.
Raimy, and M. Wertheimer for facilitating the work, and to A. E. Myers
and D. L. Rosenhan for critical comments on the manuscript.
2All practice questions and all actual bet questions were obtained from
the College Board files Of Educational Testing Service. Information as to
difficulty levels was available in the case of each question and constituted
the basis for question selection. The items used in the present study have
not been included. in recent CEEB tests and will not appear in future CEEB
tests. The authors wish to thank T. F. Donlon, C. T. Myers, and S. S. Myers
for their aid.
3ActuallY, expected value is somewhat higher for the item of 90% diffi-
culty level: all questions are of' a five-alternative multiple choice type, thus
yielding a 20% probability of' obtaining the answer by chance. This point never
arose in group discussions, however, so that it plays no role in any of' the
obtained effects of the group discussion conditions.
4Consistent with this interpretation) the experimenter observed that the
females in this condition, in contrast to the males) seemed more interested
in making sure that no one felt left out than in designating the most compe-
tent member for each task.
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